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Belhaj,  justiciability, and the ‘Silhouette-Like’ Act of State 
Doctrine 
 
Professor Satvinder S. Juss1 
 
In May 2018 the British Government issued, “one of the most shaming, 
self-abasing apologies ever made in the House of Commons, indeed arguably 
in any western legislature.” This is when “the attorney general read the prime 
minister’s statement saying sorry for Britain’s complicity in the abduction of a 
free man to live through six years of imprisonment and torture at the hands of 
a dictator, through which we hoped to gain information.”2 Malcolm Rifkind, a 
former Home Secretary, immediately called for a parliamentary inquiry into 
the rendition.3 The man in question was Libyan national, Abdul Hakim Belhaj, 
a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (‘LIFG’) set up two decades 
ago to fight Colonel Gaddafi. Belhaj was not alone in his alleged mistreatment. 
With him also was a man known as “Sami al-Saadi and his family [who] were 
abducted from the far east to Gaddafi’s interrogation and torture cells in 
Tripoli in 2004.” In his case, however, “[t]he British government paid £2.2m to 
settle a damages claim brought by al-Saadi and his family.” Belhaj refused to 
settle “unless he receive[d] an apology.” 4  The British courts, under the 
watchful eye of the British press which refused to let the story die, piled on 
the pressure on the executive branch of government. In late 2017, Irwin J. in 
the High Court, in reviewing the decision not to prosecute state officials, 
ruled that jurisdiction existed to consider closed material proceedings.5  
In May 2018, just before the apology was issued, the Judge had to deal 
with the “twenty identified passages,”6 where remarkably, ‘privilege’ had 
wrongly not been claimed. He was left to remind everyone how the, “case 
connects national security, international relations, difficult jurisdictional 
questions, the use of closed proceedings in a new area,7 and it is this which is 
the subject-matter of discussion here. It is noteworthy that the alleged torture 
here was by foreign officials (albeit with British complicity), in a foreign state, 
at the behest of another foreign government, involving someone who was a 
 
1 Professor of Law, Dickson Poon School of Law, Kings College London.  The author is indebted to 
the valuable research assistance provided by Emily Campbell in the preparation of this chapter.   
2  Will Hutton, “In the Belhaj case, Britain set aside the rule of law and moral principles”, The 
Guardian, 13 May 2018 
3 Nadia Khomani, “Abdel Hakim Belhaj rendition: ex-minister calls for inquiry” The Guardian, 12 
May 2018 
4  Nick Hopkins & Richard Norton Taylor, “Blair government's rendition policy led to rift between UK 
spy agencies”, The Guardian, 31st May 2016 (Available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/may/31/revealed-britain-rendition-policy-rift-between-spy-agencies-mi6-mi5 ) 
5 Belhaj & Anor v Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) [2017] EWHC 3056 (Admin) (01 December 
2017). Irwin J. was mindful that, “[t]he most important problem” with closed material proceedings, “is 
that, even if justice is being done, it cannot be seen to be being done.” 
6 Belhaj & Anor v Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2018] EWHC 977 (Admin) (03 May 2018) 
at para 18.  He ruled that, “the twenty identified passages of ‘underclaimed’ privilege were errors” and 
“were not an attempt at ‘cherry picking’”, at what should be disclosed. 
7 Ibid. at para 14 
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foreign national. For the courts, the question was traditionally a political one 
because of the  sensitivity to foreign policy relations, in circumstances where 
the legal validity of ‘foreign acts of state’ could not be judicially assessed in 
the absence of known judicial or manageable standards, making such a claim 
in  jurisdictional terms, a ‘non-justiciable’ one. As against this, torture was 
internationally proscribed, and if relief were to be refused by a domestic 
court, there was no international forum with jurisdiction to do so. Added to 
this, the ‘act of state’ doctrine itself was of uncertain scope and definition. Its 
application was often a matter of pure speculation. If the doctrine itself was 
vague it could scarcely provide a sound basis for legal judgment. To what 
extent these arguments still held good was the legal question in Belhaj. 
The macabre tale of Abdul Hakim Belhaj is best recounted in the UK 
Supreme Court’s landmark judgment of January 2017.8  In February 2004, 
whilst living in China, Mr. Belhaj and his wife, Mrs Boudchar, a Moroccan 
national, set out to claim asylum in the United Kingdom. They never did. 
Chinese officials detained them. They put them instead on a flight to Kuala 
Lumpur. There, after being held for two weeks by the Malaysian authorities, 
they were in March “allowed to leave for the United Kingdom but were 
required to go via Bangkok.” Again, they never did. In another bizarre twist, 
they were in Bangkok, “taken off the aircraft by Thai officials and delivered to 
agents of the United States.” They were then flown to Libya in a US-registered 
aircraft, “said to have been owned by a CIA front company” and in Libya  
taken to Tajoura prison. Mrs Boudchar was released some three months later 
but Mr Belhaj was not. He was held successively at Tajoura and Abu Salim 
prisons for six years. He was then just released in March 2010. In 2013 they 
both took legal action. Both alleged torture and serious mistreatment by US 
and Libyan officials in Libya. Both alleged that the British government were 
complicit in what happened to them. They did not claim that British officials 
were directly involved in their rendition and torture. What both claimed was 
that information about their detention in Malaysia, from where they were 
about to board a flight to London, was passed by the United Kingdom’s 
Security Intelligence Service (‘SIS’) to the Libyan intelligence services. The SIS 
then assisted the rendition flight with transit facilities at the British-owned, 
but American operated base, at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The 
defendants included the intelligence services, the departments of state 
responsible for them, the then Foreign Secretary Mr Straw, and Sir Mark 
Allen, who was a senior SIS official. If in May 2018, therefore, there was an 
apology by the UK government to give, it would appear that there was much 
to apologise for. 
 
The Foreign Act of State Doctrine 
 
The judicial story begins in December 2013.  Once legal action was 
 
8 see especially, Lord Sumption in Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors (Rev 1) [2017] UKSC 3 (17 January 
2017) at para 33 at para 177 
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initiated events moved fast. In the High Court9 Simon J. took  strict view.  He 
endorsed the orthodox position. This was a political question and it “has the 
potential to jeopardise this country's international relations and national 
security interests,” because there will be “the perception that a forensic 
investigation of what occurred within the territory of a foreign state is an 
illegitimate interference with that state's internal affairs.”10 He held that the 
domestic courts could not get into political questions. This was an Act of State 
at the behest of the US government in Libya. The claims raised were not 
justiciable in a court of law. Ultimately, they were for the UK government of 
the day. The “sensitivity of any investigation into the conduct of those said to 
be acting on behalf of the United States outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States”11 means that with respect to, “the acts alleged to have been carried out 
by officials of China, Malaysia, Thailand and Libya in those countries, … the 
act of state doctrine applies and such claims are non-justiciable.” In fact, even 
if a court of law wished to get into such questions, there were no “‘judicial or 
manageable’, or ‘clear and identifiable’ standards by which such acts may be 
judged” when considering “the activity of a foreign state on its own territory” 
with respect “to the legal validity of those acts.”12  
In short, the claims were “only justiciable in so far as they rely on 
allegations of negligence,”13 but here too Simon J’s strict approach rejected 
them on grounds that, “none of the locations where the Claimants allege they 
were detained, or from where they allege they were transferred, was under 
British control.” In fact, “[t]he alleged detentions and transfers are said to 
have involved, or to have resulted from, the actions of agents of foreign 
states.” Indeed, even the liability of UK officials’ for ‘misfeasance in public 
office’ and for ‘negligence’ arose from actions of foreign states. Moreover, the 
places where the Claimants alleged injuries occurred were also not under 
United Kingdom control. On top of this, “the Claimants are not, and never 
have been UK nationals, did not have the right to enter or remain in the 
United Kingdom and were not resident within the United Kingdom during 
the relevant period.”14 Why any of this put the adjudication of these claims 
beyond the reach of the courts is not clear. In fact, Samuel Shepson has 
questioned how, “[i]n this case, the court found that one formulation of the 
act of state doctrine, which focuses on cases concerning the legislative or 
executive acts of other states, would compel the court to hold the dispute non-
justiciable.”15 
Nevertheless, change was afoot.  And in a big way. Some six-months 
after this decision, as the pages of this journal have previously recounted, the 
 
9  Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors [2013] EWHC 4111 (QB) (20 December 2013) (Available 
at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2013/4111.html ) 
 
10 Ibid., para 145 
11 Ibid., para 145 
12 Ibid., at para 146. 
13 Ibid at para 145 and 152 (3).   
14 Ibid., at para 133 
15 Samuel Shepson, “Jurisdiction in Complicity Cases: Rendition and Refoulement in Domestic and 
International Courts”, Columbia Journal of International Law (2015, vol. 53, pp. 701-751) at p. 733 
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Supreme Court considered the lawful parameters of ‘justiciability’ in a case 
involving a foreign religion. In Shergill,16 it explained how the concept “refers 
to a case where an issue is said to be inherently unsuitable for judicial 
determination by reason only of its subject matter.”17  Such cases, however, 
were generally limited and fell into one of two categories. The first was where 
the issue was “beyond the constitutional competence assigned to the courts 
under our conception of the separation of powers.” Here the “paradigm cases 
are the non-justiciability of certain transactions of foreign states and of 
proceedings in Parliament”. The second involved “issues of international law 
which engage no private right of the claimant or reviewable question of 
public law.” The latter were not justiciable in the abstract, but “must 
nevertheless be resolved if their resolution is necessary in order to decide 
some other issue which is in itself justiciable”.18   The Supreme Court in 
Shergill eschewed a strict approach. It was clear that, “the boundaries of the 
category of ‘transactions’ of states which will engage the doctrine now are a 
good deal less clear today than they seemed to be forty years ago.”19 Simon 
J.’s decision in Belhaj, whether a domestic court would ever be allowed to 
adjudicate upon any sovereign or jure imperii act committed by a foreign state 
anywhere abroad now became less assured and clear-cut.  
It accordingly now fell to the Court of Appeal in 2014 20  to 
acknowledge, in the words of Lloyd Jones LJ, that the courts had nothing to 
fear because, “a fundamental change has occurred within public international 
law.” There “has emerged a system which includes the regulation of human 
rights by international law” and which is “reflected in a growing willingness 
on the part of courts in this jurisdiction to address and investigate the conduct 
of foreign states and issues of public international law.”21 The claims by Mr. 
Belhaj and his wife, Mrs Boudchar, were of “particularly grave violations of 
human rights” concerning, “[t]he abhorrent nature of torture.”22 Moreover, 
the “proceedings are either [against] current or former officers or officials of 
state in the United Kingdom or government departments or agencies,”23 such 
that, “[t]hey are not entitled to any immunity before the courts in this 
jurisdiction.” In fact, contradicting Simon J’s dictum, “this is not a case in 
which there is a lack of judicial or manageable standards” but that, “[o]n the 
contrary, the applicable principles of international law and English law are 
clearly established. The court would not be in a judicial no man's land.”24 
 
16  Shergill & Ors v Khaira & Ors [2014] UKSC 33 (11 June 2014) (Available at  
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2014/33.html ) For a discussion , see Satvinder Juss “Back to the 
future: justiciability, religion, and the figment of ‘judicial no-man’s land” [2016] Public Law, April , 
pp. 198-206 
17 Shergill & Ors v Khaira & Ors [2014] UKSC 33 (11 June 2014) at para 44 
18 ibid., at paras 41-43 
19 Ibid at para 42 
20 see Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1394 (30 October 2014)  
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/1394.html      
21 Ibid., at para 115 
22 ibid., at para 116 
23 ibid., at para 117 
24 Ibid., at para 118 
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Indeed, in a bold pitch for the observance of the rule of law, Lloyd LJ 
stridently declared that, “the stark reality is that unless the English courts are 
able to exercise jurisdiction in this case, these very grave allegations against 
the executive will never be subjected to judicial investigation.” Given that, 
“there is, so far as we are aware, no alternative international forum with 
jurisdiction over these issues” unless the court heard the claims, “these very 
grave allegations would go uninvestigated and the appellants would be left 
without any legal recourse or remedy.”25 This was the reality in the cold light 
of day. The Court of Appeal had no qualms in recognizing it.  
The scene was set for the Supreme Court. In their January 2017 
decision,26 their Lordships did not mince their words. All referred to the  
imprecise and indeterminate nature of the foreign act of state doctrine. Lord 
Mance described the “‘silhouette-like’ nature of doctrine”,27 drawing from  
what the Court of Appeal in Yukos v Rosneft Oil had said in 2012, namely, 
“[t]he important thing is to recognise that increasingly in the modern world 
the doctrine is being defined, like a silhouette, by its limitations, rather than to 
regard it as occupying the whole ground save to the extent that an exception 
can be imposed.”28 His Lordship also referred to Dr Francis Mann, who in his 
1986 book29 had lamented how, “[p]ublic policy dominates one of the most 
difficult and most perplexing topics which, in the field of foreign affairs, may 
face the municipal judge in England: the doctrine of the foreign act of State 
displays in every respect such uncertainty and confusion and rests on so 
slippery a basis that its application becomes a matter of speculation.” Lord 
Neuberger said that the doctrine, “has all the advantages and disadvantages 
of a principle that has been developed on a case by case basis by judges over 
the centuries.” 30  Lord Sumption noted how, [t]he English decisions have 
rarely tried to articulate the policy on which the foreign act of state doctrine is 
based and have never done so comprehensively.”31 In an Australian decision, 
Perram J. described how, “beyond the certainty that the (doctrine) exists there 
is little clarity as to what constitutes it.”32  
Academics have been no less critical. Matthew Nicholson mused how, 
“[v]ague and undefined legal doctrines that are nevertheless determinative 
present a paradox; how can doctrines whose content, scope and application 
are uncertain lead to a legal judgment?”33 Matthew Alderton observed how, 
 
25 ibid., at para 119 
26Belhaj & Anor v Straw & Ors (Rev 1) [2017] UKSC 3 (17 January 2017)  
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2017/3.html   
27 Ibid., at para 44 
28 Yukos v Rosneft Oil Co. (No.2) [2012] EWCA CIV 855; [2014] QB 458 (at para 115) 
29 F. A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts, (OUP, 1986) where he uses this description in the 
introduction to the chapter entitled ‘The Foreign Act of State’.  This has since been published in the 
Oxford Scholarship Online in March 2012 and is available at  
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198255642.001.0001/acprof-
9780198255642  
30 ibid., at para 118 
31 Lord Sumption at para 225 
32 Perram J. in Habib v Commonwealth [2010] FCAFC 12 at para 38 
33  Matthew Nicholson, “The Political Unconscious of the English Foreign Act of State and Non-
Justiciability Doctrine(s)” Int’L & Comp. Law Quarterly (Volume 64, Issue 4, pp. 743-781) at p. 744 
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“[c]ommon law judges have historically taken an indifferent, and at times 
outwardly hostile, view to the examination of issues with ‘international 
significance’ in domestic courts. The reluctance of the judiciary to adjudicate 
upon such issues is founded on what are considered the axiomatic principles 
of state sovereignty, the separation of powers and the comity of nations. In 
sum, it has been the case that the judiciary has traditionally abstained from 
adjudicating upon issues which may impact upon the relations between states 
— that being the duty and province of the executive arm of government. 
Although the foundations of this practice are ostensibly sound, the judicial 
application of these principles to cases that contain complex factual and legal 
questions of a transnational nature often creates confusion and leads to 
inconsistent decision-making.”34  
 
The concept of Justiciability  
 
It was amidst such pronounced skepticism of the doctrine that the 
‘justiciability’ of the foreign act of state doctrine ultimately fell to be decided. 
What made the task easier for the UK Supreme Court was the allegation of 
torture against the UK government. The Courts could not be seen to be 
turning their backs on something so egregious. Lord Mance explained matters 
cautiously: “[w]hether an issue is non-justiciable falls to be considered on a 
case-by-case basis. Considerations both of separation of powers and of the 
sovereign nature of foreign state or inter-state activities may lead to a 
conclusion that an issue is non-justiciable in a domestic court ….” In fact, “… 
in deciding whether an issue is non-justiciable, English law will have regard 
to the extent to which the fundamental rights of liberty, access to justice and 
freedom from torture are engaged …” 35  Of course, in Lord Neuberger’s 
words,36 there may be “a challenge to the lawfulness of the act of a foreign 
state which is of such a nature that a municipal judge cannot or ought not rule 
on it” so that “the courts of this country will not interpret or question dealings 
between sovereign states.” The “[o]bvious examples are making war and 
peace, making treaties with foreign sovereigns, and annexations and cessions 
of territory.”37 The courts of this country also “will not, as a matter of judicial 
policy, determine the legality of acts of a foreign government in the conduct 
of foreign affairs.” In the same way, “international treaties and conventions, 
which have not become incorporated into domestic law by the legislature, 
cannot be the source of domestic rights or duties and will not be interpreted 
by our courts.” The rationale for this is, “that domestic courts should not 
normally determine issues which are only really appropriate for diplomatic or 
 
34 Matthew Alderton, Matthew, “The Act of State Doctrine: Questions of Validity and Abstention from 
Underhill to Habib”, [2011] Melbourne Journal of International Law (2011, Vol. 12, Issue 1,)  see, 
Introduction On-line at  at http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2011/1.html  
35 Ibid., at para 11(iv)(c) 
36 Ibid., at para 123 
37 Here Lord Neuberger referred to Lord Pearson’s judgment in Nissan v Attorney General [1970] 237, 
which however concerned a Crown act of state, but where the remark was none the less equally 
apposite to the foreign act of state doctrine. 
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similar channels.”38 Such a rule “is based on judicial self-restraint, in that it 
applies to issues which judges decide that they should abstain from resolving 
…. It is purely based on common law, and therefore has no international law 
basis, although … its application (unsurprisingly) can be heavily influenced 
by international law.”39  
The origin of the doctrine of judicial self-restraint is itself judge-made, 
as the Buttes Gas case shows.40  The facts there were quite different They 
raised international boundary and inter-state law issues. These arose from a 
dispute over the territorial waters of the emirate of Sharjah around the island 
of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf. When Lord Wilberforce enunciated the 
principle that “the courts will not adjudicate upon acts done abroad by virtue 
of sovereign authority”41 he drew upon the US Supreme Court's decisions in 
Underhill v Hernandez42 and Oetjen v Central Leather Co,43 which provided the 
foundation for the act of state doctrine in the United States.44 In Buttes Gas, 
Lord Wilberforce had, “quoted in extenso from a letter written by the Legal 
Adviser to the US Department of State,” that “issues relating to disputed 
territorial jurisdiction should be analysed by reference to ‘the so-called Act of 
State doctrine which is traditionally limited to governmental action within the 
territory of the respective state’, and arguing that judicial self-restraint ‘rather 
follows from the general notion that national courts should not assume the 
functions of arbiters of territorial conflicts between third powers even in the 
context of a dispute between private parties’ (p 936B-C). In essence, this was 
the argument that Lord Wilberforce accepted.”45    
But discomfiture in judicial circles with the foreign act of state doctrine 
nonetheless remained. Paul Daly has described as the “so-called ‘political 
question’ doctrines” but where “[n]o definition has common currency, which 
makes discussion difficult and increases the risk of attacking a straw man.”46 
Writing in 2002, Lawrence Collins has said that: “[t]he idea that some matters 
are simply not justiciable is not one which comes easily to lawyers and 
judges.  But in the field of foreign affairs it is an idea which has gained much 
currency as a result of constitutional doctrine in the United States, and as a 
result of its adoption by the House of Lords in the Buttes Gas case.”47 It arises 
because of, “what may be described as sensitivity to foreign policy interests, 
and certainly not deference to the views or objectives of the executive”48  Yet, 
 
38 Lord Neuberger here referred to Shergill v Khaira [2015] AC 359 paras 40 and 42)." 
39 Ibid., at para 151. 
40 Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888 
41 ibid., at pp 933-934 
42 Underhill v Hernandez 168 US 250 (1897). 
43 Oetjen v Central Leather Co 246 US 297 (1918) 
44 per Lord Sumption at para 219 of Belhaj 
45 per Lord Mance in Belhaj at para 57. 
46 Paul Daly, “Justiciability and the ‘political question’ doctrine” Public Law, (2010, January, pp.160-
178) at p. 160 
47 Lawrence Collins, “Foreign Relations and the Judiciary” Int’l & Comp. Law Quarterly ( Vol. 51, 
July 2002, pp. 485-510) at p. 497 
48 Lawrence Collins, “Foreign Relations and the Judiciary” Int’l & Comp. Law Quarterly ( Vol. 51, 
July 2002, pp. 485-510) at p. 510 
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as we have seen, learned opinion has upto now been divided as to its proper 
foundation.  
The question raised in Belhaj was a timely one because it asked 
whether outside of the area of inter-state boundary disputes between nations, 
the ‘act of state’ doctrine could be invoked for a violation of a fundamental 
human right such as an act of state torture. The Supreme Court has now given 
an emphatic and resounding answer to that question. 
 
Tolerating Torture  
 
Torture, said the UK Supreme Court, was different. Lord Sumption 
recognized a proper role for the foreign Act of State doctrine, just as Lord 
Mance had done,  in that, “[i]f a foreign state deploys force in international 
space or on the territory of another state, it would be extraordinary for an 
English court to treat these operations as mere private law torts giving rise to 
civil liabilities for personal injury, trespass, conversion, and the like.”49  This is 
because, “[o]nce the acts alleged are such as to bring the issues into the ‘area 
of international dispute’ the act of state doctrine is engaged.”50 However, this 
was  a far cry from a domestic court tolerating torture by its own state 
officials because,51 “[t]he purpose of the foreign act of state doctrine is to 
preclude challenges to the legality or validity of the sovereign acts of foreign 
states.”  But, “[i]t is not to protect English parties from liability for their role in 
it.” Although, this “[i]n itself, … would not prevent them from taking 
incidental advantage of the foreign act of state doctrine” and indeed this was 
known to have happened in a case where British officials took  advantage of 
the doctrine when they assisted in military action overseas by a foreign 
sovereign,52the stark reality was that, “torture is different.”  Torture was, “by 
definition an act of a public official or a person acting in an official 
capacity.”53 Moreover, the United Kingdom was required under the Torture 
Convention, “to criminalise not only torture (as defined) but acts constituting 
complicity in torture.”54 
 
49 Here Lord Sumption referred to Lord Wilberforce in Buttes Gas (p 931D-E). 
50 Ibid., at para 234 
51 Lord Sumption, at para 266 
52 Lord Sumption gave the example of R (Noor Khan) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2012] 
EWHC 3728 (Admin)  
53 Lord Sumption here drew attention to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (hereafter the ‘Torture Convention)Article 1 of which 
states: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions.” 
54 Lord Sumption here referred to Article 4 of the Torture Convention which states that: “1. Each State 
Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an 
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in 
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Against this background, Lord Sumption was able to rule how “it 
would be contrary to the fundamental requirements of justice administered 
by an English court to apply the foreign act of state doctrine to an allegation 
of civil liability for complicity in acts of torture by foreign states.” 55  This is 
because “[r]espect for the autonomy of foreign sovereign states, which is the 
chief rationale of the foreign act of state doctrine, cannot extend to their 
involvement in torture, because each of them is bound erga omnes and along 
with the United Kingdom to renounce it as an instrument of national or 
international policy and to participate in its suppression.” Otherwise, one 
would have the paradoxical result whereby, “the only point of treating 
torture by foreign states as an act of state would be to exonerate the 
defendants from liability for complicity.” The plain fact here was that, “[t]he 
defendants are not foreign states. Nor are they the agents of foreign states. 
They are or were at the relevant time officials and departments of the British 
government. They would have no right of their own to claim immunity in 
English legal proceedings, whether ratione personae or ratione materiae.”56  
 
A Pyrrhic Victory ?  
 
The decision in Belhaj follows logically and inexorably from A(FC)57. 
However, in that case, evidence had been obtained through torture by a 
foreign state but without the complicity of the British authorities. Lord 
Hoffman had no doubt that, “[t]he use of torture is dishonourable. It corrupts 
and degrades the state which uses it and the legal system which accepts it”58 
and that “the rejection of torture by the common law has a special iconic 
importance as the touchstone of a humane and civilised legal system.”59  Yet, 
what was different in A(FC) was that the Secretary of State, “does not contend 
….that evidence obtained from third parties by torture in the United 
Kingdom would also be admissible. He accepts that it would not. But he 
submits that the exclusionary rule is confined to cases in which the torture has 
been used by or with the connivance of agents of the United Kingdom…,”60 
which was not the case there.  In Belhaj, of course, torture was undertaken 
allegedly with the ‘connivance of agents of the UK’.  Indeed, there was an 
explicit allegation of UK complicity in foreign torture.  
Where Belhaj goes further than the A(FC) case, therefore, is in its 
unequivocal  rejection of Lord Hoffman’s obiter remark that, “there may be 
cases in which he [ie the Home Secretary] is required to act urgently and 
 
torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take 
into account their grave nature.” 
55 Lord Sumption at para 262 
56 Lord Sumption does go onto say that (at para 262) that, “On the other hand, they would be protected 
by state immunity in any other jurisdiction, with the result that unless answerable here they would be in 
the unique position of being immune everywhere in the world. Their exoneration under the foreign act 
of state doctrine would serve no interest which it is the purpose of the doctrine to protect.” 
57 A & Ors v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 (8 December 2005) 
58 ibid., at para 82 
59 ibid., at para 83 
60 ibid., at para 89. 
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cannot afford to be too nice in judging the methods by which the information 
has been obtained, although I suspect that such cases are less common in 
practice than in seminars on moral philosophy.”61 Belhaj suggests that such 
cases may not after all be less common than had been assumed a decade ago. 
For this reason, Belhaj helps re-emphasise age-old values of constitutionalism, 
by placing the onus of controlling the Executive firmly on the Judiciary, and 
reminding us of Lord Griffiths’ adage, expressed in more confident times that, 
“... the judiciary accept a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law 
that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to 
countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of 
law.”62 
Belhaj could not have come too soon. This is because in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks, as the ill-fated ‘War on Terror’ has spread from beyond the 
USA63 to other parts of the world,64 counter-terrorist measures have posed 
ever new challenges for the rule of law. Stalwart academics have been at the 
forefront of reminding us, as Loiuse Arbour has done, that, “[t]he entire 
system of abductions, extra-legal transfers and secret detentions is a complete 
repudiation of the law and of the justice system. No state resting its very 
identity on the rule of law should have recourse or even be a passive 
accomplice to such practices.”65  Torture is particularly insidious.  As John T. 
Parry explains, “modern torture as a practice is hidden. Sometimes this 
hidden quality is more official than actual because rarely does torture remain 
secret from all. Yet it stays hidden, in the sense that it remains outside or at 
the margins of prevailing political discourse. One reason for the ability of 
modern torture to be hidden while in plain sight may be its frequently 
nationalist and colonial character. Torture often happens offstage, overseas, 
during military and intelligence operations, and the victims are not members 
of the community; they are others, foreign; they are enemies, not friends.”66  
Belhaj helps us understand how it is this feature which has led to the state 
sanctioning of torture, enabled by rational bureaucratic structures, and in 
which the law has often been thoroughly complicit. 
Yet, there remains the tantalizing question of whether Belhaj may have 
come at too high a price.  It may makes effective counter-terrorism in the 
national self-interest more difficult. As a forum, the judicial process is not 
well-suited for the management of national security issues.  Yet, Belhaj now 
 
61 Ibid., at para 93 
62 R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court Ex parte Bennet [1993] 3 All ER 138  at para 61-62.  Quoted 
with approval in Jamison, R v [2007] NICC 38  at para 28 
(Available at http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICC/2007/38.html ) 
63 See, Satvinder S. Juss, Human Rights & America’s War on Terror (Routledge, October 2018 (ed.) ) 
64 See, Satvinder S. Juss, Beyond Human Rights & the War on Terror (Routledge, November 2018 
(ed)). 
65 Louise Arbour, “ In our name and on our behalf” European Human Rights Law Review (2006, Vol. 
4, pp. 371-385) at p.377 
66  John T Parry, ‘The Shape of Modern Torture, Extraordinary Rendition and Ghost Detainees,’ 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2005, Vol. 19, Issue 6 (2),) 516 (see on-line version under 
‘Modern Torture as Hidden Practice’  
at http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2005/19.html ) 
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requires the courts to engage in it. Eyal Benvenisti was not wrong when he 
said that, “the political branches have no incentive to bestow legitimacy on 
the international legal system, in which their State is only one actor among 
numerous actors, many of whom do not face judicial restrictions.” He has 
suggested that, “their only interest is the judicial vindication of their action 
abroad.” This has not been difficult to find because, “[w]ere a court to decide 
against the government in a foreign affairs matter, officials may refuse to 
comply, and the government many even restrict the court’s jurisdiction.” If 
that happened then “such decisions could expose judges to the official and 
public critique of jeopardizing national interests and assisting enemies and 
rivals.” For this reason, “[j]udges have …readily accepted this dictate” of a 
restriction  on their powers from the political branches of government.67 All 
too often what has been expected of the courts is supine judicial acquiesce in 
illegal state acts. The pressures which governments may impose on judicial 
authorities are clear from another case, of five other Libyans in Kamoka.68  Like 
Belhaj, they too were associated with the LIFG. They too had all sought 
asylum in the United Kingdom.69 In an insightful and revealing analysis, 
Flaux LJ, referred to the shifting allegiances of the UK government when, 
“[f]ollowing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the UK government formed an 
increasingly close relationship with the Qadhafi regime” so that [i]t was only 
in October 2005, during that period of rapprochement with the regime, that 
the LIFG was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the United Kingdom,”70 
thus placing the five Libyans seeking asylum in the UK in an invidious 
position.  
Ultimately, what Belhaj help us do is confront our understanding of 
‘terrorism.’ Federico Fabbrini characterized it as an “emergency” which he 
says is “the condition that exists when a democracy affronts a momentary 
threat to effective sovereignty without however facing any existential danger: 
a condition, hence, falling somewhere between ordinary conditions and 
conditions of war or crisis.” 71   This author has elsewhere argued 72  that 
terrorism is not some “fiendish force” but “a narrative of normal historical 
conflict,” which must be understood as in times past when “[g]overnments 
spoke of insurrections, political assassinations and civil wars that were 
accepted as epoch-making.” Belhaj, as it weaved its way through the courts, 
contains an implicit recognition of this mundane fact.  
 
67 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International’s 
Resolution on ‘The Activities of National Courts and the International Relations of their State,’ 
European Journal of International Law (1994, vol. 5, pp. 423-439) at p 426 
68 Kamoka & Ors v Security Service & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 1665 (25 October 2017)  
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/1665.html   
69 Ibid at para 3. They had brought a claim damages against the various defendants for the torts of false 
imprisonment, trespass (to person and property) and misfeasance in public office” (para 1). 
70 Ibid., at para 4 
71 Federico Fabbrini, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Times of Emergency:  Judicial Review of Counter-
Terrorism Measures in the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 28 
Yearbook of European Law,  (January 2009, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp. 664–697) at p. 664-665 
72 Satvinder Singh Juss, “Terrorism and the Exclusion of Refugee Status in the UK” Journal of Conflict 
& Security Law (Vo. 17, No. 13, Winter 2012, pp. 465-500) at p. 468 
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